On Incentives and Control in Organizations
E680265
"On Incentives and Control in Organizations" is an influential doctoral thesis in economics that develops foundational theories on how incentive structures and control mechanisms shape behavior and performance within firms.
Statements (47)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic work
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doctoral thesis ⓘ economics dissertation ⓘ |
| analyzes |
delegation of decision rights in firms
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how incentive schemes affect employee effort ⓘ optimal design of contracts within organizations ⓘ trade‑offs between risk sharing and incentives ⓘ |
| contributesTo |
formal modeling of organizational behavior
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foundations of organizational economics ⓘ theory of incentives in firms ⓘ understanding of control systems in organizations ⓘ |
| describes |
conditions for efficient internal organization of firms
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effects of monitoring on effort and shirking ⓘ relationship between control intensity and agent autonomy ⓘ role of performance measurement in incentive contracts ⓘ |
| documentType | PhD thesis ⓘ |
| examines |
allocation of authority within firms
ⓘ
costs and benefits of monitoring in firms ⓘ how control systems mitigate agency problems ⓘ interaction between incentives and organizational structure ⓘ multi‑task incentive problems in organizations ⓘ |
| field |
contract theory
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economics ⓘ organizational economics ⓘ theory of the firm ⓘ |
| focusesOn |
behavior of agents within firms
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control mechanisms in organizations ⓘ incentive structures in firms ⓘ information asymmetry in firms ⓘ monitoring and control systems ⓘ moral hazard in organizations ⓘ organizational design ⓘ performance within organizations ⓘ principal–agent relationships ⓘ |
| hasConcept |
control rights in firms
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incentive compatibility in organizations ⓘ monitoring technology and effort choice ⓘ organizational control systems ⓘ performance‑based compensation ⓘ |
| influenced |
later research on organizational design
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studies of corporate governance mechanisms ⓘ subsequent work in contract theory ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| proposes |
formal models of incentive contracts
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frameworks for designing control mechanisms ⓘ |
| recognizedAs |
foundational contribution to incentive theory in firms
ⓘ
influential work in organizational economics ⓘ |
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.
Bengt Holmström (studies, later MIT)
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doctoralThesis
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On Incentives and Control in Organizations
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subject surface form:
Bengt Holmström