After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy
E56296
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy is a seminal work of neoliberal institutionalist theory in international relations that explains how states achieve cooperation through international institutions even in the absence of a dominant hegemonic power.
Statements (46)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic monograph
→
book → non-fiction book → |
| academicDiscipline |
international relations theory
→
political science → |
| academicStatus |
classic text in international political economy
→
seminal work in neoliberal institutionalist theory → |
| addresses |
conditions for stable international cooperation
→
problem of cooperation under anarchy → role of international regimes in world politics → |
| arguesAgainst |
the view that hegemony is necessary for international cooperation
→
|
| author |
Robert O. Keohane
→
|
| centralClaim |
international cooperation can be sustained without a single dominant hegemonic power
→
international institutions facilitate cooperation by reducing transaction costs and providing information → states can achieve mutually beneficial outcomes under anarchy through regimes and institutions → |
| countryOfOrigin |
United States
→
|
| critiques |
hegemonic stability theory
→
|
| field |
international political economy
→
international relations → |
| focusesOn |
cooperation in trade and monetary relations
→
post–World War II international economic order → |
| genre |
international relations literature
→
political science literature → |
| hasImpactOn |
policy debates on international economic institutions
→
scholarly understanding of international organizations → |
| influenced |
debates between neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism
→
neoliberal institutionalist research program in international relations → regime theory literature → |
| language |
English
→
|
| publicationYear |
1984
→
|
| publisher |
Princeton University Press
→
|
| relatedConcept |
collective action problems
→
complex interdependence → international regimes → iterated games → prisoner’s dilemma → |
| subject |
game theory in international relations
→
hegemonic stability theory → international cooperation → international institutions → regime theory → world political economy → |
| theoreticalApproach |
liberal institutionalism
→
neoliberal institutionalism → |
| usesMethod |
game theoretic models
→
rational choice analysis → |
Referenced by (1)
| Subject (surface form when different) | Predicate |
|---|---|
|
Robert O. Keohane
→
|
notableWork |