Democracy in Deficit
E438124
Democracy in Deficit is a seminal public choice economics book by James M. Buchanan and Richard Wagner that critiques Keynesian fiscal policy and explains how democratic political incentives lead to chronic government budget deficits.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Democracy in Deficit canonical | 1 |
Statements (50)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
book
ⓘ
economics book ⓘ non-fiction book ⓘ public choice economics book ⓘ |
| aimsTo |
explain chronic budget deficits in democracies
ⓘ
link political processes to fiscal outcomes ⓘ |
| author |
James M. Buchanan
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Richard E. Wagner NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| coAuthor |
James M. Buchanan
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
Richard E. Wagner NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| countryOfOrigin |
United States of America
ⓘ
surface form:
United States
|
| criticizes |
Keynesian economics
ⓘ
Keynesian fiscal policy ⓘ deficit financing ⓘ discretionary fiscal policy ⓘ short-run demand management ⓘ |
| field |
economics
ⓘ
political economy ⓘ public choice theory ⓘ |
| genre | academic literature ⓘ |
| hasKeyConcept |
constitutional constraints
ⓘ
fiscal illusion ⓘ intergenerational redistribution via debt ⓘ political incentives ⓘ rules versus discretion in policy ⓘ |
| hasPerspective | public choice perspective ⓘ |
| influenced |
constitutional fiscal reforms
ⓘ
literature on political budget cycles ⓘ research on deficit bias ⓘ |
| influencedBy |
Keynesian revolution in macroeconomics
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
constitutional economics ⓘ public choice theory ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| mainSubject |
Keynesian fiscal policy
ⓘ
constitutional political economy ⓘ democratic political incentives ⓘ fiscal policy ⓘ government budget deficits ⓘ public debt ⓘ |
| notableFor |
analysis of democratic bias toward deficits
ⓘ
public choice critique of Keynesianism ⓘ |
| proposes |
constitutional constraints on fiscal policy
ⓘ
fiscal rules ⓘ |
| publicationYear | 1977 ⓘ |
| publisher | Academic Press NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| relatedWork |
Public Finance in Democratic Process
NERFINISHED
ⓘ
The Calculus of Consent NERFINISHED ⓘ |
| theorizes |
political incentives for overspending
ⓘ
systematic deficit bias in democracies ⓘ time inconsistency in fiscal policy ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
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Instruction
You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Input
Subject: Democracy in Deficit Description of subject: Democracy in Deficit is a seminal public choice economics book by James M. Buchanan and Richard Wagner that critiques Keynesian fiscal policy and explains how democratic political incentives lead to chronic government budget deficits.
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.