Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy

E266786

"Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.

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Predicate Object
instanceOf academic paper
economics paper
macroeconomics paper
monetary economics paper
aimsTo compare outcomes under rules and discretion
understand how credibility affects inflation and output
analyzes effects of different monetary policy regimes
inflation outcomes under rules and discretion
output outcomes under rules and discretion
role of policymaker credibility
author David B. Gordon
Robert J. Barro
concludes discretionary policy can lead to higher inflation without higher output
reputation can partially substitute for formal rules
contribution explanation of inflationary bias under discretion
formalization of reputation effects in monetary policy
framework for analyzing credibility and policy outcomes
field dynamic inconsistency
game theory
inflation
macroeconomics
monetary policy
time inconsistency
hasConcept discretionary policy
inflation expectations
output gap
policy rule
reputational equilibrium
influenced debate on rules versus discretion in central banking
literature on time inconsistency in monetary policy
research on central bank credibility
language English
relatedTo Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy self-linksurface differs
surface form: Barro-Gordon model of monetary policy

Kydland and Prescott’s work on rules rather than discretion
status influential paper in monetary economics
topic credibility of monetary authorities
inflation and output trade-off
inflation bias
optimal monetary policy
reputation in monetary policy
rules versus discretion in monetary policy
uses dynamic game framework
rational expectations

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Jordi Galí hasNotableWork Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy relatedTo Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy self-linksurface differs
this entity surface form: Barro-Gordon model of monetary policy