Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
E266786
"Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.
All labels observed (2)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Barro-Gordon model of monetary policy | 1 |
| Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy canonical | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T2440922 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
Target entity: Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy Context triple: [Jordi Galí, hasNotableWork, Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy]
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A.
the "Volcker shock" in U.S. monetary policy
The "Volcker shock" in U.S. monetary policy refers to the dramatic interest rate hikes and tight monetary stance of the early 1980s aimed at breaking entrenched inflation, which triggered a deep recession but ultimately restored price stability and reshaped central banking practice.
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B.
Federal Reserve monetary policy framework
The Federal Reserve monetary policy framework is the set of goals, principles, and tools that guide the U.S. central bank’s decisions on interest rates and money supply to promote stable prices, maximum employment, and sustainable economic growth.
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C.
Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Policy
"Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Policy" is a seminal work by economist Jan Tinbergen that analyzes how economic decision-making powers should be optimally distributed between central and local authorities to achieve effective and efficient policy outcomes.
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D.
Models of Bounded Rationality
Models of Bounded Rationality is a collection of Herbert A. Simon’s influential works that develop the concept of bounded rationality, explaining how real-world decision-making is constrained by limited information, cognitive capacity, and time.
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E.
Economic Policy: Principles and Design
"Economic Policy: Principles and Design" is a foundational economics book by Jan Tinbergen that systematically develops the theory and methodology of designing and implementing effective economic policies.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
Target entity: Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy Target entity description: "Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.
-
A.
the "Volcker shock" in U.S. monetary policy
The "Volcker shock" in U.S. monetary policy refers to the dramatic interest rate hikes and tight monetary stance of the early 1980s aimed at breaking entrenched inflation, which triggered a deep recession but ultimately restored price stability and reshaped central banking practice.
-
B.
Federal Reserve monetary policy framework
The Federal Reserve monetary policy framework is the set of goals, principles, and tools that guide the U.S. central bank’s decisions on interest rates and money supply to promote stable prices, maximum employment, and sustainable economic growth.
-
C.
Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Policy
"Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Policy" is a seminal work by economist Jan Tinbergen that analyzes how economic decision-making powers should be optimally distributed between central and local authorities to achieve effective and efficient policy outcomes.
-
D.
Models of Bounded Rationality
Models of Bounded Rationality is a collection of Herbert A. Simon’s influential works that develop the concept of bounded rationality, explaining how real-world decision-making is constrained by limited information, cognitive capacity, and time.
-
E.
Economic Policy: Principles and Design
"Economic Policy: Principles and Design" is a foundational economics book by Jan Tinbergen that systematically develops the theory and methodology of designing and implementing effective economic policies.
- F. None of above. chosen
Statements (43)
| Predicate | Object |
|---|---|
| instanceOf |
academic paper
ⓘ
economics paper ⓘ macroeconomics paper ⓘ monetary economics paper ⓘ |
| aimsTo |
compare outcomes under rules and discretion
ⓘ
understand how credibility affects inflation and output ⓘ |
| analyzes |
effects of different monetary policy regimes
ⓘ
inflation outcomes under rules and discretion ⓘ output outcomes under rules and discretion ⓘ role of policymaker credibility ⓘ |
| author |
David B. Gordon
ⓘ
Robert J. Barro ⓘ |
| concludes |
discretionary policy can lead to higher inflation without higher output
ⓘ
reputation can partially substitute for formal rules ⓘ |
| contribution |
explanation of inflationary bias under discretion
ⓘ
formalization of reputation effects in monetary policy ⓘ framework for analyzing credibility and policy outcomes ⓘ |
| field |
dynamic inconsistency
ⓘ
game theory ⓘ inflation ⓘ macroeconomics ⓘ monetary policy ⓘ time inconsistency ⓘ |
| hasConcept |
discretionary policy
ⓘ
inflation expectations ⓘ output gap ⓘ policy rule ⓘ reputational equilibrium ⓘ |
| influenced |
debate on rules versus discretion in central banking
ⓘ
literature on time inconsistency in monetary policy ⓘ research on central bank credibility ⓘ |
| language | English ⓘ |
| relatedTo |
Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
self-linksurface differs
ⓘ
surface form:
Barro-Gordon model of monetary policy
Kydland and Prescott’s work on rules rather than discretion ⓘ |
| status | influential paper in monetary economics ⓘ |
| topic |
credibility of monetary authorities
ⓘ
inflation and output trade-off ⓘ inflation bias ⓘ optimal monetary policy ⓘ reputation in monetary policy ⓘ rules versus discretion in monetary policy ⓘ |
| uses |
dynamic game framework
ⓘ
rational expectations ⓘ |
How these facts were elicited
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You are a knowledge base construction expert. Given a subject entity and a description of it, return factual statements that you know for the subject as a JSON list of dictionaries(triples), where keys must be "subject", "predicate" and "object". The number of facts may be very high, between 25 to 50 or more, for very popular subjects. For less popular subjects, the number of facts can be very low, like 5 or 10. # Requirements - If you don't know the subject at all, return an empty list. - If the subject is not a named entity, return an empty list. - Include at least one triple where predicate is "instanceOf". - Do not get too wordy. - Separate several objects into multiple triples with one object.
Subject: Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy Description of subject: "Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.
Referenced by (2)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.