Moore's paradox

E143658

Moore's paradox is a philosophical problem highlighting the oddity of asserting a sentence like "It is raining, but I don't believe that it is raining," which seems logically consistent yet pragmatically absurd.

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Moore's paradox canonical 1

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Statements (48)

Predicate Object
instanceOf epistemological problem
philosophical paradox
appearsIn G. E. Moore's papers on certainty and belief
concerns apparent inconsistency between content and use of assertions
pragmatic absurdity of certain statements
rationality of belief and assertion
relationship between belief and assertion norms
self-knowledge of one’s own beliefs
describes oddity of certain first-person assertions
distinguishedFrom Liar paradox
logical contradiction
example "It is raining, but I do not believe that it is raining"
"p and I believe that not-p"
"p and I do not believe that p"
field epistemology
philosophy of language
hasComponent propositional content p
speaker’s belief state about p
hasForm "p and I believe that not-p"
"p and I do not believe that p"
implies speaker is irrational if statement is true
speaker violates norms of assertion
speaker violates norms of rational belief
involves first-person authority over mental states
first-person present-tense belief ascriptions
self-referential belief reports
tension between belief and assertion
transparency of belief to truth
logicalStatus logically consistent
namedAfter G. E. Moore
pragmaticStatus pragmatically absurd
raisesQuestion how belief is connected to sincere assertion
how to model belief in formal epistemology
what norms govern assertion
whether one can be mistaken about one’s own beliefs
relatedTo belief norm of assertion
knowledge norm of assertion
logical consistency
pragmatic inconsistency
pragmatics of language
self-knowledge
self-referential paradoxes
speech act theory
the norm of assertion
studiedBy G. E. Moore
Ludwig Wittgenstein
contemporary analytic philosophers
timePeriod 20th-century analytic philosophy

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G. E. Moore notableIdea Moore's paradox