Kreps–Milgrom–Roberts–Wilson reputation model
E1223592
UNEXPLORED
The Kreps–Milgrom–Roberts–Wilson reputation model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that explains how long-run players can sustain cooperation or deter entry by building reputations for certain types or behaviors in repeated interactions under incomplete information.
All labels observed (1)
| Label | Occurrences |
|---|---|
| Kreps–Milgrom–Roberts–Wilson reputation model canonical | 1 |
How this entity was disambiguated
This entity first appeared as the object of triple T16613986 — resolving that mention is where its identity was fixed. The disambiguator weighed these candidate entities and picked the highlighted one (or “None”, minting a new entity). This is how homonymy is resolved: the same surface form can point to different entities.
NED1
Entity disambiguation (via context triple)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Kreps–Milgrom–Roberts–Wilson reputation model Context triple: [David M. Kreps, knownFor, Kreps–Milgrom–Roberts–Wilson reputation model]
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A.
Game Theory (with Drew Fudenberg)
"Game Theory (with Drew Fudenberg)" is a widely used graduate-level textbook that provides a rigorous and comprehensive introduction to modern game theory and its applications in economics.
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B.
Rubinstein bargaining model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
-
C.
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
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D.
Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
"Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.
-
E.
The Economics of Reciprocity
The Economics of Reciprocity is a scholarly work that analyzes how reciprocal behavior and social norms influence economic interactions and outcomes beyond purely self-interested market models.
- F. None of above. chosen
- G. Unsure - the case is ambiguous/there is not enough information to decide.
NED2
Entity disambiguation (via description)
gpt-5-mini-2025-08-07
Target entity: Kreps–Milgrom–Roberts–Wilson reputation model Target entity description: The Kreps–Milgrom–Roberts–Wilson reputation model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that explains how long-run players can sustain cooperation or deter entry by building reputations for certain types or behaviors in repeated interactions under incomplete information.
-
A.
Game Theory (with Drew Fudenberg)
"Game Theory (with Drew Fudenberg)" is a widely used graduate-level textbook that provides a rigorous and comprehensive introduction to modern game theory and its applications in economics.
-
B.
Rubinstein bargaining model
The Rubinstein bargaining model is a foundational game-theoretic framework that analyzes how two parties reach agreement over time through alternating offers under the influence of impatience and strategic delay.
-
C.
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (with Jean-Jacques Laffont)
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation is a foundational economics book that develops a rigorous principal–agent framework for designing optimal contracts and regulatory mechanisms in public procurement and regulated industries.
-
D.
Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy
"Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy" is an influential economic paper that analyzes how different monetary policy regimes and the credibility of policymakers affect inflation and output outcomes.
-
E.
The Economics of Reciprocity
The Economics of Reciprocity is a scholarly work that analyzes how reciprocal behavior and social norms influence economic interactions and outcomes beyond purely self-interested market models.
- F. None of above. chosen
Referenced by (1)
Full triples — surface form annotated when it differs from this entity's canonical label.